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1
Introduction

There is a traditional African saying, umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu – ‘people
are people through other people’.1 Being human necessitates contact with other
humans. From birth people enter into a world of intertwining stories in which no
one person can completely separate herself or himself from the living text of
another. The past is full of these interweaving stories creating a complex web of
relationships that are often reconstructed into larger narratives in attempts to
create meaning. Few would deny the complexity of such historical reconstructions
as the narratives of conflict and peace within Northern Ireland and South Africa
during the late 20th century. In what ways are the histories of conflict and peace
within these two countries interconnected? What meaning might be gleaned from
analyzing them alongside one another through a lens of contact? The peace
processes of both Northern Ireland and South Africa strove for reconciliation and
achieved a peaceful resolution of conflict; however, to this day both countries are
dealing with the realities of broken relationships and systems as a result of conflict.
Does this mean reconciliation was not achieved? How might the study of these two
peace processes be helpful in developing a more nuanced understanding of
reconciliation? Ultimately, these two case studies illustrate how a peaceful
resolution of conflict is merely one step in the process of reconciliation and that
experiences of positive contact are essential to reconciliation.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 1, (Report,
South Africa, October 29, 1998), 127.
1
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Defining Terms
Given the scope of this paper, and the potential ambiguity associated with the
term reconciliation, a definition of terms is prudent. Within the context of this work
a distinction is made between the peaceful resolution of conflict and reconciliation.
A peaceful resolution of conflict is defined as a form of compromise between two or
more conflicting groups that is reached either formally or informally through
peaceful means resulting in an overall cessation of violence. This does not
necessarily mean that any prior relationships have been restored, or that justice has
been achieved. It merely suggests that all sides have collectively come to agreement,
through nonviolent means, that the perpetuation of further hostilities in the future
is not a viable option for progress. Reconciliation is understood as a way of life that
is grounded in hope and radically inclusive of all people through the costly and
continual pursuit of justice and peace that acknowledges the past and strives to
transform broken relationships and systems in order to embody the reality of future
wholeness. In this way reconciliation is much more than a cessation of conflict but it
is an ongoing process. Lastly, in this context the term contact implies positive
personal interaction between peoples over a sustained period of time.2

The Historical Background of Apartheid

This understanding of contact originates from a theory within social psychology
known as contact theory. The theory was developed in 1954 by Muzafer Sherif and
suggests that repeated opportunities of interaction between different social groups
are vital to reducing negative attitudes of the other.
2
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The word apartheid means separateness and was invented by an Afrikaner
historian P van Biljoen in 1935.3 Apartheid became an official structural policy of
systematic segregation and discrimination on the basis of race following the South
African general election of 1948. During this election most of the black population
was prohibited from voting and the National Party (NP), who championed a policy
of apartheid, came to power through the support of the white electorate.
Nevertheless, influencing factors of apartheid date back to the 17th century when the
first Dutch settlers arrived in South Africa during 1652. Originally driven by
economic interests in the Indies, the small Dutch Cape Colony was founded by the
Dutch East India Company as a supplies station for their trade ships traveling
between the East and West. Within the first ten years of settlement, the beginnings
of a complex, racially stratified society had already developed within the colony.4
Over the next three centuries, continued growth and expansion of Dutch settlers
across South Africa in addition to British imperialism during the 19th century, lead
to increased tensions between the peoples of South Africa.
In 1910 the four existing colonies in South Africa, all of which were under
British control, were brought together in what is known as the Union of South
Africa. This granted greater autonomy to the unified provinces but was largely seen
by black South Africans as a great sell out, because only whites were allowed to
participate in the political process. Consequently, there were two primary results of
this union: the formation of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1912, and the
Christie Kenneth, The South African Truth Commission, (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2000), 11.
4 Leonard Monteath Thompson, A History of South Africa, 3rd ed. (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2001), 33.
3
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implementation of more severe discriminatory legislation, such as the Natives Land
Act of 1913. The latter reinforced segregation and structural inequalities by
preventing black South Africans from buying, renting, or using land except in
designated reserves or homelands. Pass Laws were also legislated requiring blacks
to carry an identification permit when outside their designated homeland. In this
way the government was able to maintain a strict system of segregation and to
control the movement of black citizens. Other disparities developed throughout
South African society within the realms of education, labor, wages, and politics. In
part these inequalities and the intentional separation of peoples were rationalized
based on false beliefs in religious and biological superiority of white South Africans.
Ultimately, the segregation of society lead to the oppression of the black South
African majority by a white minority, who were mainly of Dutch and English
descent. This dominant minority controlled most of the country’s, land, resources,
and wealth.
With the formation of political resistance movements such as the ANC in
1912, long campaigns of organized defiance against the injustices in the country
began. Many supporters of the ANC were mobilized to peacefully protest
discriminatory legislation during the height of apartheid, following the 1948
elections. Organized marches, strikes, boycotts, defiance of pass laws, and student
protests are a few of the ways in which many South Africans resisted the system of
apartheid. These means of peaceful protest were met by stricter legislation and
increased violence, as demonstrated in the Sharpeville massacre in March of 1960
when police opened fire on peaceful protestors killing 69 people and wounding 186.
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Following this the government declared a state of emergency banning the ANC and
another resistance organization known as the Pan African Congress (PAC). As a
result, the ANC began a campaign of armed resistance against the South African
Government in 1961 alongside continued peaceful protests.

The Historical Background of ‘The Troubles’
The Troubles is the name used to describe the period of political violence in
Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1998; nonetheless, the roots of this conflict can be
traced to the 16th and 17th centuries. During the 1500s Britain possessed colonial
holdings around Dublin and in 1609 James I expanded upon these footholds by
proclaiming a land settlement for the northern region of the island known as Ulster.
This began the process of British colonization primarily undertaken by transplanted
Englishmen and lowland Scots. Motives for British colonization of Northern Ireland
are complex including theories related to economics and national defense. For
example, after the defeat of the Spanish armada in 1588, the surviving Spanish ships
sailed north in hopes of escaping the British and returning home along the west
coast of Ireland. A number of these fleeing ships crash-landed off the coast of Ireland
and one theory suggests that the British became alarmed by the possibility of a
foreign country obtaining a foothold so close to Britain. Under this premise, the
realization that the island posed a threat to the economic and national security of
the nation, prompted the British to secure their own power over the island via
colonization.
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As in many cases of settler populations, tensions rose between the British
colonizers and the native Irish, resulting in several centuries of intermittent
instances of rebellion against British rule over the island. Irish independence was
not achieved until 1922 after the war for Irish independence. Consequently, this war
ended with the partition of the island by the British into what are today Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In the partitioning of the island the British
assured that a majority population of predominantly protestant people identifying
as British, due to their deep roots coming out of the colonization of the 17th century,
existed within Northern Ireland. Consequently, in doing this, the British also
established a minority population of predominantly Catholic people who identified
as Irish. A common misconception of the conflict in Northern Ireland is that it is
solely a result of religious division. While religion is an important aspect of Northern
Irish history, this misconception is a vast oversimplification of a conflict which is a
much more complex interweaving of history, politics, economics, and culture. Irish
scholar Feargal Cochrane demonstrates this complexity in stating that, “A form of
ethno-nationalist division emerged, where religion served to define and identify the
sides, rather than to create those divisions in the first place. To know someone’s
religion was to know their politics and their culture”.5
The division that was created within Northern Ireland led to high tensions
and segregation between the two communities. This was perpetuated by a one party
rule within the devolved Parliament of Northern Ireland under the Ulster Unionist
Party (UUP). The UUP managed to maintain its dominance up until 1972 through
Feargal Cochrane, Northern Ireland: The Reluctant Peace, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2013), 4.
5
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support from the unionist majority population, the use of gerrymandering, and a
winner take all electoral system. As a result, discrimination against the
predominantly Catholic nationalist community became common in the realms of
education, housing, employment, policing, and voting. The perpetuation of these
inequalities led to the rise of both violent and nonviolent resistance.
In 1967 the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was formed to
peacefully protest discrimination within the country and advocate for greater
justice. Yet, on a number of different occasions violence broke out during originally
peaceful protests that turned into riots as marchers were attacked by loyalist
sectarian groups in addition to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), a primarily
protestant police force. In response to these clashes between protestors and the
RUC, the British Army was deployed to maintain peace. The heightened level of
tension during this time lead to the re-formation of militant sectarian groups within
both nationalist and unionist communities who began to see violence as the only
means of furthering their political and ideological aspirations. These paramilitary
groups included the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Ulster Volunteer
Force (UVF), and the Ulster Defense Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters UDA/UFF.
The escalation of violent and counter violent resistance reached its height in 1972
due to the events of what is commonly known as Bloody Sunday. On January 30th
1972 Non-violent protestors gathered for an anti-internment demonstration in
Derry but as the march progressed British paratroopers opened fire upon the
peaceful crowd killing thirteen and injuring another thirteen, one of whom died of
his wounds several months later. As a result, Britain dissolved the Parliament of
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Northern Ireland and introduced direct rule over the country as it was propelled
into further sectarian violence over the course of the next three decades. Similar to
the situation in South Africa, this background history of the Troubles provides
necessary context for understanding the peace negotiations in Northern Ireland and
why contact or the lack thereof is essential to discuss in light of reconciliation.

South Africa

The Peace Negotiations in South Africa
When looking at South Africa after its transition away from a regime of
apartheid, it is impossible to ignore the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).
This commission was an integral aspect to the formation of a ‘New South Africa’ and
to the process of reconciliation within the nation. While one can hardly discuss the
peace efforts in South Africa without addressing the TRC, this commission is merely
one part of a complex and often ambiguous narrative of peace. Thus, it is useful to
recognize how the move towards a peaceful resolution of conflict, as seen
throughout the several years of negotiations that ultimately lead to South Africa’s
first democratic nonracial elections in 1994, laid the foundations for the formation
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
After several decades of oppression, conflict, and violence resulting from the
legalized policy of apartheid, tentative moves towards initiating a process of
negotiation began to develop between the governmental leadership and the ANC.
Both sides took steps towards engaging in these talks due to different realizations.

9
For the government, it became evident that maintaining the system of apartheid was
unrealistic for two reasons: it was financially crippling to the nation, and the
dominant white minority was rapidly becoming more outnumbered by the black
majority. On the other hand, liberation movements realized their ability to
completely overthrow the regime was unlikely and the greatest opportunity for
change lay in peaceful negotiations. Therefore, in August of 1987 a group of sixtyone white South Africans lead by Alex Boraine and Frederik van Zyl Slabber, cofounders of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa and both
members of the Progressive Party, met with seventeen members of the ANC over
three days in Dakar Senegal.6 Here, the participants of this meeting came to
understand that they had a common interest in seeking a peaceful resolution to the
conflict in South Africa and expressed unanimous support for a negotiated
settlement.7 In an attempt to open negotiations between the National Party and
ANC, another strand of communication was developed. Prior to his release from
prison, and without the knowledge of the ANC leadership in exile, Nelson Mandela
was approached by members of the NP who recognized his influential leadership.8
The ensuing conversations revolved around the ANC commitment to armed
resistance, their alliance with the communist party, legalization of the ANC, the
withdrawal of troops from townships, ending the state of emergency, but most
importantly balancing the ANC demand for majority rule in South Africa with the

Thompson, A History of South Africa, 244.
Ibid.
8 Ibid, 245-246.
6
7
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white minorities concerns over this demand.9 Eventually, De Klerk met with
Mandela in prison and the initiation of these conversations lead to his release on
February 11th 1990 after twenty-seven years of imprisonment.
Following Mandela’s release, peace talks continued with increased attention
though not always directly relating to the pressing disagreements between the
various parties. Mandela had suggested that a climate for negotiations should be
created before proceeding to formal negotiations. In May of 1990 another series of
meetings known as the Groote Schuur talks occurred over a period of three days,
this time within South Africa at the president’s official residence in Cape Town.10
Here ANC leaders and their government counterparts met in an attempt to get to
know one another and begin to form personal relationships. They also agreed upon
conditions that had to be met in order to end political conflict within the nation. This
resulted in a series of steps being taken by the NP government to move the peace
negotiations along by gradually removing the nationwide State of Emergency,
releasing the majority of political prisoners, and allowing political exiles to return
with immunity from prosecution. In August of 1990 the Government and the ANC
reaffirmed their commitment to the Groote Schuur Minute and elaborated upon it in
what is know as the Pretoria Minute. This was another meeting in which provisions
surrounding the continual release of political prisoners and the Internal Security Act
were discussed along with the announcement that the ANC would be suspending all

9

Ibid, 245.
Ibid, 248.
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armed action from its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, in the interest of moving
towards a peacefully negotiated political settlement.11
With the legalization of the ANC in February of 1990 and further steps taken
by the NP government to facilitate peaceful negotiations, the ANC was able to hold
its first conference within South Africa since being banned. At this conference in
1991, 2,244 elected delegates worked to transform this organization into an official
political party by establishing a sixty-six member National Executive Committee. At
this conference, Nelson Mandela was selected to represent the party as its president
and Cyril Ramaphosa was chosen to serve as the secretary general. Following this
transition in November of 1991 and the government’s final repeals of remaining
apartheid laws after the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes, the peace process
moved into more official territory with the formation of a Convention for a
Democratic South Africa (CODESA). CODESA incorporated nineteen different
political parties each represented by approximately twelve member delegations for
a total of around 228 delegates who were mostly African and many of whom were
women.12 This convention opened on December 20th 1991 and was presided over by
two judges, Petrus Schabort and Ismael Mahomed, the first black judge to be
appointed to the Supreme Court in South Africa.13 Most of the politicians involved in
CODESA had received mandates of support from their constituencies with the
The Pretoria Minute, (Agreement, South Africa, August 6, 1990),
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=3884.
12 Thompson, A History of South Africa, 252.; and South African History Online:
Towards a People’s History, “The CODESA Negotiations,” Last Modified April 21,
2016, http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/codesa-negotiations.
13 T. R. H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, 5th ed. (Hampshire England:
Macmillan Press; New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 560.
11
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exception of the NP representatives. Amongst the National Party there was
considerable concern revolving around the convention. In order to prove that he
had the support of a majority of his constituents, particularly Afrikaners, President
De Klerk decided to hold a whites only referendum on March 17th, 1992 in which
68.7% out of the 87% of eligible voters endorsed the continuation of negotiations
and reform.14
CODESA established five working committees which sought to address issues
surrounding: the new constitution, establishing an interim government, the future
of the homelands, the time period for the implementation of these changes, and the
electoral system.15 Two of these issues, the development of an interim government
and a constitution, proved most problematic to peace negotiations due to the
parties’ inability to reach any form of consensus beyond the desire to have each of
these governmental structures put in place. This is largely because the NP desired a
minority veto within the interim government and insisted upon a higher majority
percentage needed to make decisions pertaining to the constitution and bill of rights
than the ANC would agree to. As a result, this lead to a deadlock in negotiations and
the breakdown of CODESA particularly after the violent massacre at Boipatong on
June 17th, 1992.
In tracing the peace process in South Africa up to 1994 violence did not
completely cease but was taking place alongside negotiations. According to a race
relations survey, in 1990 there were 3,699 political killings, in 1991 there were 2,
Thompson, A History of South Africa, 254.; and South African History Online, “The
CODESA Negotiations”.
15 South African History Online, “The CODESA Negotiations”.
14
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706, in 1992 there were 3,347, in 1993 there were 3,794, and in 1994 there were
2,476.16 This helps to illustrate the high levels of tension and frustration that
accompanied peace talks during this time, particularly after negotiations stalled in
1992. In spite of the progress that had been made, it is understandable why CODESA
broke down and why Mandela suspended all talks with the government after the
events at Boipatong. On June 17th, hostel dwellers of the Inkatha Freedom Party
(IFP), later determined by the TRC to have been in league with members of the
police, attacked a neighboring shack settlement in the township of Boipatong killing
forty-five people, mainly women and children.17 At this time, the opportunity for a
peaceful settlement looked minimal as ANC-Government relations were strained;
nevertheless, the two parties maintained a channel of communication through their
chief negotiators, Roelf Meyer representing the NP, and Cyril Ramaphosa
representing the ANC. These men met a total of forty-eight times between June and
September 1992 as they worked to resolve outstanding issues between their
parties. As a result of this relationship, on September 26th of 1992 the two were able
to bring both Mandela and De Klerk together to sign a Record of Understanding that
lead to the reopening of talks at the Multi-Party Negotiation Process in February
1993. Essential to the resumption of negotiations and the reaching of a compromise
was the policy adoption of a sunset clause that would honor existing contracts of
civil servants, judges, police, and military personnel as well as provide for a period

Thompson, A History of South Africa, 248.
Thompson, A History of South Africa, 254.; and Davenport, South Africa: A Modern
History, 564.
16
17
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of compulsory power-sharing in the governmental cabinet.18 Moreover, leading up
to the Multi-Party Negotiation Process positive relationships between the two
parties were further fostered at two bosberaads, or meetings of undisclosed
locations, in December of 1992 and January of 1993. At these meetings the various
participants, including members from both the NP and ANC, lived together, ate
together, drank together, and talked together over the course of four days in casual
circumstances helping to break down barriers and stereotypes as they came to a
better understanding of one another.19
Finally, as negotiations progressed, a new Multiparty Forum was convened
on April 1st 1993 including all of the major political parties in the country besides
the IFP and Conservative party who both opposed the negotiation process. This
forum eventually created the interim constitution, which it approved on November
18th 1993, and set the date for upcoming elections on April 27th, 1994. Once
approved, the interim constitution was endorsed by the standing apartheid
parliament in order to create continuity and legitimacy of governance between the
old government and the and new. Parliament also formed a Transitional Executive
Council (TEC) that would govern until the nonracial elections as well as an
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) that was in charge of organizing the
upcoming elections. Consequently, many of the barriers that had once prevented
compromise had been overcome throughout the peace negotiations that lead to the
Thompson, A History of South Africa, 255.
Padraig O’Malley, “Northern Ireland and South Africa: Hope and History at a
Crossroads”, in Northern Ireland and the Divided World: The Northern Ireland
Conflict and the Good Friday Agreement in Comparative Perspective, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 296.
18
19
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development of an interim constitution. Nevertheless, the country still teetered on
the edge between peaceful resolution and further violence all the way up to the
elections as the ANC and NP fervently sought to bring the IFP and Conservative
Party within the folds of the political settlement and because no one could predict
what would happen once the elections results had been finalized.

The Democratic Elections of 1994
After decades of inequality and racial segregation under apartheid along with
several years of negotiations, the atmosphere was filled with anticipation as the first
nonracial democratic elections in South African history approached. Many were
uncertain about how the elections would turn out and whether or not a narrative
that had been stacked towards severe violence and bloodshed would end in a
peaceful transition of power after all. The election was originally set for April 27th
1994; however, in order to accommodate the large masses of people that were
expected to turn out for the vote, it was decided that the election would be held over
a period of four days from April 26th to the 29th.20 It is estimated that over twenty
million South Africans, around eighty-six percent of the electorate, turned out to
vote over the course of these four days, often waiting for hours just to get to the
polling stations. Although the election process, under the regulation of the IEC, was
critiqued for its inability to live up to the standards of the European Union
observers, the end results still reflected the pre-election polls fairly well given the
difficulties that an understaffed and inexperienced IEC faced in managing the voting.
20

Thompson, A History of South Africa, 263.
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On May 6th the results were finally announced with the ANC wining 62.65% of the
votes and 252 seats in the National Assembly, the NP winning 20.39% of the votes
and 82 seats, the IFP wining 10.54% of the votes and 43 seats, while the remaining
23 seats were split between four other parties.21 Moreover, due to various aspects of
the interim constitution which stated that the National Assembly was to elect a
president and that cabinet seats were to be awarded based on representation in the
Assembly, Nelson Mandela was sworn into office on May 10th 1994 as President of
South Africa with F.W. De Klerk and Thabo Mbeki as deputy presidents and the NP
and IFP were awarded 5 and 3 cabinet positions respectively.22Despite the miracle
of this peaceful transition, the Nation still had a legacy of injustice and inequality to
address as it attempted to create one unified vision for the future of a new South
Africa.

The Beginnings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The main method that was selected to address the painful history of
apartheid was a type of truth commission. Conversations about holding a truth
commission had been present early on in negotiations through voices of people like
Professor of Human Rights Law at the University of Western Cape Kader Asmal. He
reasoned that a truth commission would help move the nation towards a number of
crucial goals that included enabling people to achieve a measure of justice by
acknowledging their suffering, providing a basis for a collective acknowledgement
Thompson, A History of South Africa, 264 and Davenport, South Africa: A Modern
History, 568.
22 Ibid.
21
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of the illegitimacy of apartheid, and making room for genuine reconciliation.23
Additionally, the ANC had prior experience with their own truth commissions after
accusations were levied against them in 1991 claiming that human rights violations
within some of their camps in-exile during the 1980s and early 1990s had been
committed.24 In response, the ANC appointed several commissions of enquiry into
these allegations know as the Stuart, Skweyiya, and Motsuenyane commissions
which all reported back confirmation that gross violations of human rights had been
committed within the ANC camps.25 As a result, in 1993 the National Executive
Council of the ANC accepted the criticisms directed at the organization but called for
a more comprehensive national truth commission so that these violations might be
seen within the context of human rights violations that had taken place throughout
South Africa during the regime of apartheid.26 It was partially in the light of these
precedents that the new South African government issued the National Unity and
Reconciliation Act in 1995 that established the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and laid out its structure, objectives, functions, and power.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Kader Asmal, Reconciliation through Truth: A Reckoning of Apartheid's Criminal
Governance, 2nd ed., (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers; Oxford: James Currey
Publishers; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 10.
24 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 1, 50.; and
Russell Daye, Political Forgiveness: Lessons from South Africa, (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis
Books, 2004), 47.
25 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 1, 50.
26 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 1, 50.; and
Daye, Political Forgiveness: Lessons from South Africa, 47.
23
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According to the National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995 the objective
of the TRC was “To promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of
understanding which transcends the conflicts and division of the past”.27 The
intention was that this might be achieved through the completion of four major
tasks given to the Commission. These included establishing as complete a picture as
possible of the causes, nature, and extent of the gross violations of human rights
between 1 March 1960 and 10 May 1994, restoring the human and civil dignity of
victims through testimony, facilitating the granting of amnesty, and making
recommendations to the President for preventing future violations of human
rights.28 Nonetheless, the commission recognized that the TRC was not an end in
itself, for it could only begin the process of reconciliation, which necessitated the
continual efforts of all South Africans striving to transform the broken relationships
and systems resulting from apartheid.
The formal hearings of the Commission began on April 15th 1996 and the first
five volumes of its final report were released in October of 1998. These were
followed by the publication of two additional volumes in March of 2003. The
Commission was presided over by seventeen commissioners who were broadly
representative of the South African Society. The selection of the commissioners
began with the public nomination of 186 women and men, 40 of whom were
interviewed in public by a multi-party panel, which then presented a list of 25

Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, (Legislative Act,
South Africa, July 19, 1995), 4.
28 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 1, 57.
27
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candidates to Nelson Mandela for the final appointment.29 Archbishop Desmond
Tutu was selected to be the Chairperson of the Commission with Dr. Alex Boraine as
Vice-Chairperson. Structurally the TRC was divided into three committees: The
Human Rights Violations Committee, the Amnesty Committee, and the Reparations
and Rehabilitation Committee.
The primary function of the Human Rights Violations Committee (HRVC) was
to listen to the many testimonies of people who were victims of gross violations of
human rights, inquire into these abuses, and construct as complete a picture as
possible of their cause, nature, and extent. This committee was directed by eight of
the commissioners including Desmond Tutu (Chairperson), Mr. Wynand Malan
(Vice-Chairperson), and Ms. Yasmin Sooka (Vice-Chairperson). Many of the hearings
focused on particular incidents while others were more topical. There were
institutional hearings on business and labor, faith communities, the health sector,
media, and prisons in addition to political party hearings and special hearings on
children and women.30 Moreover, these hearings were not limited to victims of
apartheid organizations or state security forces but included those who were
victims of liberation organizations as well. In this way the TRC remained unbiased
and allowed the narrative of the past to be shaped by all members of society.
In relation to the HRVC, the Amnesty Committee (AC) was charged with the
task of receiving applications for amnesty, hearing the testimonies of those who had
committed human rights violations, and determining whether or not amnesty would
be granted. Amnesty was awarded based on two main principles: One, that those
29
30

Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, 691.
Daye, Political Forgiveness: Lessons from South Africa, 50.
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applying for amnesty make full disclosure of all relevant facts including the extent to
which others were involved and any chain of command; Two, that offenses were
associated with a political objective. This means that the act was committed in
execution of an order, on behalf of, or with the approval of an organization,
institution, or liberation movement in furtherance of a political struggle or resisting
said struggle and does not include acts committed for personal gain or malice.31
Three commissioners managed this committee, Adv. Chris de Jager, Ms. Sisi
Khampepe, and Adv. Denzil Potgieter.
As suggested by its title, the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee was
given the task of determining the appropriate measures of compensation to victims
suffering from gross violations of human rights and how best to help them
reintegrate into society. Recognition was given that in many cases no amount of
reparations could adequately address the suffering of victims but it could help to
restore the human and civil dignity of such victims. One of the main issue with this
committee was that it had no funding of its own and thus could only make
recommendations to the President and Parliament of applicants qualifying for a
measure of reparation. This committee was presided over by five commissioners
lead by Chairperson Ms. Hlengiwe Mkhize and Vice-Chairperson Dr. Wendy Orr.
Overall, the Commission heard over twenty thousand testimonies of gross
violations of human rights and received more than seven thousand applications for
amnesty. Additionally, the South African Government was very intentional about the
public nature of the TRC. By holding hearings in public and publishing a report on
31

Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, 14-16.
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the commission, the TRC helped to promote a greater sense of nation unity and
inclusiveness through the collective contribution of many peoples and perspectives
to the narrative of past conflict.

Northern Ireland

The Peace Negotiations in Northern Ireland
The most well known aspect of the Northern Ireland peace negotiations that
took place throughout the 1990s is the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). After several
years of formal negotiations that had begun on the 10th of June 1996 this agreement,
also know as the Belfast Agreement was finalized on April 10th 1998.32 Although
only one part of a complex and often divided history of events pertaining to the
peace process in Northern Ireland, the GFA played a significant role in illustrating
that the use of “Democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences on political
issues” was possible within the country.33 This was a step towards the peaceful
resolution of conflict and away from paramilitary violence; nevertheless, the Belfast
Agreement was far from providing closure to a number of polarizing issues or
clarity as to a united vision for the future of Northern Ireland.
To understand the full extent of the Good Friday Agreement and its location
within the peaceful resolution of conflict in Northern Ireland, it is worthwhile to
analyze the broader negotiation process. These complex peace negotiations can be
divided into two main phases. The first being talks that began under British Prime
32
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Minister John Major when he took office in 1990, and the second being negotiations
that took place under his successor Prime Minister Tony Blair beginning in 1997.

Negotiations Under Prime Minister Major
After Major took office following Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, signs of
tentative movements towards peace began to appear encouraged by Secretary of
State Peter Brooke’s rather quiet announcement that, “Britain had ‘no selfish,
strategic, or economic interest’ in Northern Ireland and would legislate for a united
Ireland when the majority of the people of Northern Ireland expressed such a
wish”.34 One of the first illustrations of this hesitant step toward peace following
Brooke’s statement occurred in December of 1990 when the Provisional IRA
announced a three-day ceasefire over Christmas.35 This was the first official
ceasefire the IRA had issued since 1975, yet it would take another four years before
the IRA would announce a “Complete cessation of military operations” on August
31st 1994.36
Following these initial tests of the possibility of peace, the governments of
Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland began trying to foster better diplomatic
relations with one another. Additionally, Great Britain tried to encourage both
unionists and nationalists to engage in public constitutional talks. Nonetheless, this
period was largely dominated by an atmosphere of secrecy as various parties
Cochrane, Northern Ireland: The Reluctant Peace, 123.
Ibid, 124.
36 Irish Republican Army Ceasefire Statement, 31 August 1994, (Public Statement,
Northern Ireland, August 31, 1994),
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engage in clandestine negotiations with one another to the ignorance of other
parties. Despite their relatively feeble public efforts to bring some change to the
stalemate in Northern Ireland the British government engaged in a series of indirect
private talks with Sinn Féin and the IRA without the knowledge of the Irish
government, the SDLP, or unionists. During this stage of negotiations the Irish
government had also established secretive and indirect contact with both
republican and loyalist paramilitaries to the exclusive knowledge of those involved.
Sometimes this culture of secrecy even pervaded intra-party communication as in
the case of John Hume and Gerry Adams who were engaged in secret dialogue
between 1988-1993 without their own parties’ knowledge let alone the knowledge
of the British and Irish governments.
Part of the issue with the secretive nature of these conversations, was that
they created a vast amount of mistrust and confusion between the parties. As a
result, the British were unwilling to openly deal with Sinn Fein or welcome them
into public constitutional talks until they called a permanent ceasefire, the IRA was
unwilling to declare an official ceasefire until they were certain the British would
remain neutral in Northern Ireland, and loyalist paramilitaries such as the UDA and
UVF were unwilling to lay down their own arms until the IRA did. Consequently,
sporadic violence continued throughout the 1990s even as these initial steps
towards peace were taking shape. For the most part, the violence committed by the
IRA during this time was directed at economic disruption such as the Bishopsgate
bomb in April of 1993, which caused around £1 billon of damage; however, there
were continued occasions when this violence escalated beyond economic disruption
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resulting in loss of life. An example of this was the Shakill road bombing of Frizell’s
fish shop on October 25th, 1993 that resulted in nine civilian casualties, as well as
loyalist retaliation on the 30th of October when three UFF gunmen killed eight
people at the Rising Sun Pub in the village of Greysteel. Interestingly, the
perpetuation of a cycle of violence was not the only result of these attacks. In many
ways, the shock and resulting grief from these events can be seen as a catalyst of
action that brought Irish and British politicians together in recognition of the
potential consequences in failing to move peace talks forward within the formal
political process, thus leading to the formation and publication of the Downing
Street Declaration on December 15th 1993.
This document was a Joint Declaration and “Charter for peace and
reconciliation” issued by Irish Toaiseach Albert Reynolds and British Prime Minister
John Major on behalf of their governments.37 Recognizing that this was only one
stage in the peace process, the two governments attempted to use this declaration
to move the official talks forward by emphasizing the right of the people of Northern
Ireland to exercise their own national “Self-determination on the basis of consent”,
encouraging the formation of trust between all parties, and advocating for the
commitment to “Exclusively peaceful methods” in reaching a political settlement.38
Additionally, despite their past histories of involvement, the British and Irish
Governments presented themselves as unbiased facilitators of an agreement who
were impartial when it came to the most divisive issue between unionists and
The Joint Declaration of 15 December 1993 (Downing Street Declaration), (Public
Statement, Northern Ireland, December 15, 1993), 1.
38 Ibid, 1-2.
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nationalists: continued unification with the United Kingdom or the formation of a
united Ireland. This was demonstrated by the British with their commitment to
honor the democratic decision of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland for
self-determination. Moreover, the Republic of Ireland expressed a similar
commitment that any change to the status of Northern Ireland would only come
about with the consent of an electoral majority. Their willingness to amend articles
two and three of the Irish constitution in the event of an overall settlement so as to
reflect a more neutral stance towards the future of Northern Ireland illustrates the
sincerity of this commitment.
While this declaration was a starting point for formal negotiations and laid
the foundation for key aspects of the Good Friday Agreement, the actual document
was filled with ambiguity. This placed pressure upon Gerry Adams and Sinn Fein
who wanted to be certain that the Downing Street Declaration did not undermine
their nationalist aspirations. It was at this point, in the months following the
publication of this document, that the United States of America under the leadership
of President Bill Clinton began to take a more active role in the situation of Northern
Ireland. Despite the risk it posed to his political report, in January of 1994 Bill
Clinton decided to issue Sinn Fein leader and ‘alleged terrorist’, Gerry Adams, a visa
before the IRA had announced a ceasefire.39 This frustrated Major who was trying to
force the IRA into a ceasefire but encouraged nationalists that there was an outside
power willing to act as an unbiased intermediary and whose lack of historical
involvement within the conflict could truly act as balance between unionists and
39
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nationalists desires in ways that the more historically involved British and Irish
governments could not. After several months of internal deliberation, written
correspondences with Major, and clarifications of various pieces of the jointdeclaration, Adams publicly stated on August 29th 1994 he had advised the IRA that
now existed the opportunity to end the stalemate.40 With much public anticipation
and uncertainty, the IRA then issued a short four paragraph statement declaring
that “As of midnight, August 31st, there will be a complete cessation of military
operations” for, “We believe an opportunity to secure a just and lasting settlement
has been created”.41
For many this announcement was cause for celebration; however, for the
most part unionists did not see it this way because they feared that Prime Minister
Major had made a secret deal with the IRA behind their backs.42 This illustrates how
the culture of secrecy so prevalent in the formation of the peace process continued
to impact and pervade the atmosphere of negotiations even after decisive steps
forward. Thus, unionist mistrust of the British government initiated another set of
talks that took place between Major and unionist political leaders such as James
Molyneaux of the UUP and Ian Paisley of the DUP reassuring them that no secret
deals had been made, but one problem remained. Loyalist paramilitaries were
unwilling to announce their own ceasefire until they had been convinced that no
agreements were made between the British government and the IRA, yet the British
refused to have any contact with these paramilitaries until they announced a
Ibid, 134.
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ceasefire. Therefore, the British relied upon other unionist parties to convince the
loyalist paramilitaries to move forward with a ceasefire. Meanwhile the Republic of
Ireland chose an alternative route establishing contact with organizations such as
the UDA and UVF through intermediary figures. Eventually, with enough constituent
support to avoid significant fracturing the loyalist paramilitaries issued their own
ceasefire on the 13th of October 1994.43 This cessation of violence was predicated
upon two stipulations: one, that Northern Irelands constitutional position within the
United Kingdom was secure based on a democratic majority’s right to selfdetermination and two, that the IRA ceasefire remained permanent.44
With the announcement of ceasefires from both republican and loyalist
paramilitary groups it seemed as though official peace negotiations could
commence. Unfortunately, at this point Major hesitated to open public dialogues
with Sinn Fein and to invite them into the political process out of fear for his own
governmental position. This is because unionist politicians had the ability to bring
down Major’s administration within the House of Commons and so he sought to win
over unionists before inviting Sinn Fein into the political negotiations. This brought
the central issue that would plague the peace process for years to come, even after
the Good Friday Agreement, to the forefront of negotiations for the first time. IRA
Decommissioning. For republicans this was a new precondition that Sinn Fein saw
as disconnected from their own engagement in negotiations but for unionists and
the British it was a test of the IRA’s sincerity of their ceasefire. Consequently, further
Ibid 140.
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fear and mistrust spread during an eighteen-month deadlock as an even larger
barrier over the relinquishment of arms replaced the once impenetrable wall of
achieving a cessation of violence.
At this point, a central character in the narrative of the Northern Ireland
peace negotiations entered the picture, former Senate Majority Leader in America,
George Mitchell. After being appointed by President Bill Clinton as his ‘Special
Advisor for Economic Initiatives in Ireland’, Mitchell spent three years in Northern
Ireland from 1995-1998 speaking with and mediating between many of the various
players involved in the negotiations. In the initial meetings that took place within
the first few weeks, Mitchell and his two other team members worked to assess and
provide a report on the situation in Northern Ireland specifically revolving around
arms decommissioning. In their investigation they found that IRA decommissioning
as a precursor to Sinn Fein participation in peace negotiations was extremely
unrealistic and in spite of Major’s attempt to control negotiations by threating to
reject the final report if this prerequisite was not upheld, Mitchell and his team
recommended that parallel decommissioning be implemented. This final report was
given on January 22nd 1996 and is commonly referred to as the Mitchell Principles.
These principles laid the foundation for the future negotiations and attempted to
move the talks beyond the impasse of decommissioning by calling for the absolute
commitment of all parties to “Democratic and exclusively peaceful means of
resolving political issues”.45 Unfortunately, despite the efforts of George Mitchell and
Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning, 22 January 1996,
(Report, Northern Ireland, January 22, 1996), Section III,
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/gm24196.htm.
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his team in the publication of their report, the stalemate persisted as the British
Government and unionists continued to insist of upon prior decommissioning
before political inclusion. Consequently, IRA patience with the perceived bad faith of
the British Government and incompetence of Prime Minister Major ran out and on
February 9th 1996 the ceasefire was broken when the IRA set off a bomb in the
Docklands area of London causing £85million of damage, two deaths, and a number
of injuries. As a result, the British and Irish Governments announced that multiparty talks would commence on the 10th of June 1996 but would exclude Sinn Fein.
Given his already prominent role in negotiations, knowledge of the conflict, and
neutral outside perspective, George Mitchell was selected to chair this process,
which continued for a year without much progress due to the exclusion of Sinn Fein.
Therefore, expectations were high during the 1997 British general elections as
people anticipated a change over in the government that might bring about a fresh
approach to the peace talks in Northern Ireland.

Negotiations Under Prime Minister Blair
In the May elections of 1997 change came in the form of Tony Blair, who
replaced John Major as the British prime minister, and the Labor party who took
over from the Conservatives. Blair immediately illustrated the new direction he
intended to take in Northern Ireland through his desire to meet with
representatives from all of the various parties, especially Sinn Fein. This initiative
was extremely significant because it emphasized the value of open and inclusive
negotiations and recognized parties such as Sinn Fein as valuable and legitimate
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political entities. On October 13th 1997 Blair and Adams met signaling the first
meeting between a British prime minister and a member of Sinn Fein leadership
since 1921.46 Given the new political climate and visible efforts being made by the
British government to renew “A democratic peace settlement through real and
inclusive negotiations”, the IRA made the decision to resume their ceasefire of
August 1994 by declaring “A complete cessation of military operations from 12
midday on Sunday 20 July, 1997”.47 After a period of six weeks to ensure the good
faith of the IRA, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Marjorie Mowlam,
officially invited Sinn Fein to join the multi-party negotiations at their resumption in
September 1997.48 This received negative backlash from unionist leaders who
threatened to walk out of negotiations; however, with tactful ambiguity in dealing
with the diverse parties, Blair was able to keep all but Ian Paisley’s DUP involved in
the multi-party talks and committed to principles of non-violence under the
international mediation of George Mitchell.
The negotiations were held in three different locations throughout the peace
process: Belfast, Dublin, and London.49 The Northern Irish political parties that
participated in these peace talks included Sinn Fein, the Social Democratic Labor
Party, Ulster Unionist Party, Ulster Democratic Party, Progressive Unionist Party,
Labor Party, Alliance Party, and the Women’s Coalition. Unlike the negotiations
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under Major these talks included parties from the political extremes such as Sinn
Fein and the UDP/PUP who represented republican and loyalist paramilitaries
respectively. Moreover, the participation of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
was quite influential to the successes of the negotiations because they incorporated
into the process more diverse and necessary perspectives, attempting to accentuate
the values of inclusiveness, dialogue, and tolerance that for the most part had
previously been ignored.50
Despite the achievement of managing to include all of these diverse political
parties within the negotiating process, those most stringently divided along the
ideological lines of nationalism and unionism refused to interact with one another
directly. Throughout the entirety of the peace negotiations up through the signing of
the Good Friday Agreement, delegations from the main parties, Sinn Fein and the
SDLP on one side and the UUP and the UDP/PUP on the other, were still not in direct
communication with one another.51 Therefore, George Mitchell played the essential
role of intermediary, relaying messages between parties and offering important
political judgment and assessment to all sides. It took over a year, from September
1996 to October 1997, for the parties to establish a set of procedures and vague
agenda for the discussion of substantive issues. It was during this time that the
South African Government, who had been undergoing their own movement towards
a resolution of conflict following the deconstruction of the apartheid state, invited
Feargal Cochrane, “Unsung Heroes? The Role of Peace and Conflict Resolution
Organizations in the Northern Ireland Conflict”, in Northern Ireland and the Divided
World: The Northern Ireland Conflict and the Good Friday Agreement in Comparative
Perspective, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 153.
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the various political leaders and chief negotiators of Northern Ireland to attend a
secure conference called De Hoop Indaba in the town of Arniston in the Western
Cape province. This took place in May of 1997 and at the conference President
Nelson Mandela along with many other representatives from South Africa’s
negotiation settlement of November 1993 met with the delegates from Northern
Ireland over the course of three days providing advice from their own experiences
of the complexity involved in reaching a peaceful resolution. Then, from September
1997 until March 1998 the multi-party talks of Northern Ireland focused on
outlining and discussing general issues such as developing a system of powersharing and navigating the rival British and Irish identities that existed within the
country. Finally, in the last few weeks leading up to April 10th 1998, the real
strenuous work and hard arguing took place.52
At this point, with the consent of all involved parties, Mitchell decided to
impose a one-week deadline upon the remainder of the negotiation process because
he recognized how the absence of a deadline was preventing progress. Thus, by
April 6th a draft of the agreement, known as the Mitchell Document, had been
created and distributed to all of the negotiating parties for review. Full of ambiguity
that allowed for varied interpretations, the agreement continued to be edited up to
the assigned deadline of midnight on the 9th of April. Even then unionists were still
discontent with the lack of connection between decommissioning and Sinn Fein
participation in the government but Blair refused to reopen negotiations after they
had closed. Instead he wrote a personal letter to David Trimble in attempts to
52
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reassure him of the British understanding of unionist worries related to the Good
Friday Agreement and to provide him with a form of written assurance linking
decommissioning and holding political office.53 This was enough to achieve unionist
support for the agreement and as evening approached on April 10th 1998, it was
finally confirmed that a settlement had been reached bringing to an end the
negotiation process that had balanced on the brink of collapse from its beginning.
The final result was a democratic and peaceful way forward.
Though a consensus for the Belfast Agreement had been reached at the
political level it needed to obtain public affirmation before implementation. The
agreement called for two referendums to be held on May 22nd 1998. One was to take
place in Northern Ireland and would answer the question, “Do you support the
agreement reached in the multi-party talks on Northern Ireland?”54 The other was
to take place in the Republic of Ireland regarding the amendment of Articles 2 and 3
of the Constitution.55 Holding these referendums was a way of recognizing the
importance of drawing the general public into the process of designing the new
political system rather than having it imposed upon them.
In the few months leading up to the referendum in Northern Ireland,
campaigns in favor and in opposition of the agreement were formed. The yes
campaign was disunified due to the divisions that existed between the parties who
for the most part campaigned separately from one another. This was because each
party held a different and often contradictory interpretation of the agreement’s
Letter from Tony Blair to David Trimble, 10 April 1998, (Letter, Northern Ireland,
April 10, 1998), http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/tb100498.htm.
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ambiguous language that they expressed to the electorate in order to reassure their
own constituents. An independent yes campaign did arise, but their tactics did not
always gain the approval of the main political parties. To achieve support for the
agreement without splitting their parties, groups such as the SDLP and UUP
advocated for the agreement from those positions that appeared most favorable to
their constituents. One instance that demonstrated this delicate tension was when
the independent yes campaign received an endorsement from the internationally
renowned President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, who offered to fly to Northern
Ireland the day before the vote. Despite the incredible sense of finality that this
would have apparently given to the yes campaign, Trimble was quick to oppose
Mandela’s presence on the eve of the referendum explaining, “Yes, he is an
international moral icon, but he is also the world’s best example of a former
paramilitary turned political and national leader—all without decommissioning”.56
Trimble saw Mandela in many ways as a threat to unionism illustrating the
complexity of navigating the diverse political perspectives of those involved in the
peace efforts of Northern Ireland.
Despite the challenges of disunity faced by those in favor of the agreement,
strong public desire for peace was evident as the final results of the referendum in
Northern Ireland indicated. Out of a total voter turnout of 81%, the highest in the
history of Northern Ireland, 71% of the electorate voted in favor of the agreement
and only 29% voted against it.57 Within the Republic of Ireland there was a
significantly lower turnout rate of 55%, nonetheless an overwhelming 95% of
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people voted in support of the Belfast Agreement and reform of Articles 2 and 3 of
the Constitution.58 Thus, with political settlement and public approval, a peaceful
resolution to the state of instability and violence that had plagued the nation for
decades was imminent, as the full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement
could begin.

The Good Friday Agreement
As previously mentioned, the actual contents of the Agreement were at times
quite ambiguously worded especially as they pertained to divisive issues such as
decommissioning, prisoner release, or investigations into security forces. Therefore,
even though the Agreement briefly discusses these topics the primary portion of the
document is divided into three strands. These set out the terms for new multi-party
accommodations based on nonviolence and power sharing between nationalists and
unionists.
The first of these strands was concerned with the domestic relations,
outlining the Democratic institutions within Northern Ireland. The agreement
established that a 108 member inclusive Assembly would be created with the ability
to exercise legislative and executive authority subject to safeguards protecting the
rights and interest of all sides of the community.59 The Assembly would be a power
sharing form of government with seats allocated in proportion to a party’s strength
and key decisions being taken on a cross-community basis. According to the
agreement there would also be an executive authority made up of a First Minister, a
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Deputy First Minister, and up to ten Ministers with departmental responsibilities
who would constitute an Executive Committee. The First Minister and Deputy First
Minister would be elected by the Assembly and come from opposing parties while
the posts of departmental Ministers would be allocated based on the number of
seats each party held within the Assembly.
Strand two of the Agreement emphasized cross boarder relations between
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in the development of a North/South
Ministerial Council that would be made up of representatives from both countries
and work to co-operate on areas of mutual interest throughout the island of Ireland.
Some of these areas suggested in strand two pertained to agriculture, education,
transportation, tourism, and the environment. This strand was jointly written by the
British and Irish governments but was posed as George Mitchell’s own work with
the understanding that it was more likely to be accepted by both unionists and
nationalists if it was perceived to come from an independent third party.60
The third strand of the Agreement then focused upon the relationship
between Ireland and Britain through a British-Irish Council and Conference that
would be comprised of representatives from both governments in addition to
delegates from Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, the Isle of Man, and the Channel
Islands. The intention of this council as stated in the Good Friday Agreement was,
“To promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of
relationships among the peoples of the islands”.61 Some of the specific topics to be
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addressed in these meetings included rights, justice, prisons, and policing in
Northern Ireland.

Drawing Connections
Given each of these narratives there is no doubt that in both Northern Ireland
and South Africa during the 1990s truly historic peace settlements were achieved.
This is one of the most prominent parallels between these two case studies, yet
further analysis of these events in relation to one another reveals many more
distinctions and similarities.
A broad view of these case studies illustrates a fairly similar structural
process towards peace, beginning with the tentative conversations that laid the
foundation for formal peace talks. In South Africa this was illustrated in the meeting
between representatives of the ANC and Progressive Party as well as the
conversations between future president Nelson Mandela and members of the NP
government, including active president F. W. De Klerk. In Northern Ireland the many
different secret negotiations taking place indirectly between the British government
and Sinn Fein, or the Irish Government and paramilitary organizations on both sides
demonstrate this first stage. In both countries these initial talks developed into
more formal negotiations, exemplified by CODESA in South Africa and the first
multi-party talks in Northern Ireland. However, in both cases negotiations
eventually broke down in part due to the to NP’s failure to release political prisoners
in South Africa and the exclusion of Sinn Fein within the negotiations of Northern
Ireland. Finally, formal talks were renewed in both countries resulting in the
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formation of the interim constitution of South Africa and the Good Friday
Agreement of Northern Ireland that lead to peaceful and democratic elections in
each country.
From a broad perspective, these case studies diverge with the creation of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa because no equivalent
structure was formed to address the deep history of violent and counter violent
conflict in Northern Ireland.62 The various leaders of South Africa recognized the
need to go beyond merely a peaceful resolution of conflict in “The pursuit of
national unity”.63 According to the South African Constitution this required,
“Reconciliation between the people of South Africa”, “The reconstruction of society”,
“The need for understanding but not for vengeance, the need for reparation but not
for retaliation, the need for Ubuntu but not for victimization”, and “The need to
establish truth in relation to past gross violations of human rights”.64 These
recognized needs lead to the formation of the TRC. However, at the political level in
Northern Ireland the desire for reconciliation was predominantly subverted by the
individual ideological aspirations of both communities. The political leaders of Sinn
Fein and the SDLP wanted a peace agreement to the extent that it ultimately
furthered their nationalist ideals of uniting with the Republic of Ireland. Likewise,
unionist political leaders desired a peace agreement to the extent that it supported
In May of 2008 a Commission for Victims and Survivors was established in
Northern Ireland under the Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006 as
amended by the Commission for Victims and Survivors Act 2008; however, this
commission was different in scope and practice from the TRC.
63 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, (Constitution, South
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unionist sentiments and did not alter Northern Irelands position within the United
Kingdoms. According to the Reconciliation and Victims of Violence section of the
GFA, all parties did “Recognize and value the work being done by many
organizations to develop reconciliation, mutual understanding, and respect between
and within communities and traditions in Northern Ireland… as well as pledge their
continuing support to such organizations”.65 Nonetheless, the participants in the
agreement seemed unwilling to engage in these efforts of reconciliation themselves
based on their political interactions and refusal to meet face to face. Therefore, the
Belfast Agreement serves as a good example of a peaceful resolution of conflict but
there are few clear examples within the political sphere of moving beyond this
within the process of reconciliation.66.
Another distinction is the various levels of outside involvement within
Northern Ireland compared to South Africa. Due to the historic nature of the
situation in Northern Ireland and its formation as a result of partition following the
Irish War for Independence, both the British and Irish Governments were
significantly involved in the peace negotiations. The deep connections between
Northern Ireland and the commonwealth of the United Kingdoms as well as the
Republic of Ireland made these two governments integral to achieving a peaceful
The Good Friday Agreement, 23.
I am careful to specify here the ‘political sphere’ because I recognize, as the Good
Friday Agreement does, that there are individuals and organizations within the
country who are engaged in the process of reconciliation. Many of them have had
profound impacts in helping to foster healing, forgiveness, repentance, justice, and
transformation within the country. Even in making this statement, there are some
governmental organizations, such as the Community Relations Council and the
Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition that have engaged in cross-community
reconciliation work, but as a whole this is uncommon.
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resolution of conflict. This is especially the case with the United Kingdom since
direct rule had been re-imposed upon Northern Ireland in 1972 after the events of
Bloody Sunday and British participation in the peace process was necessary to
replace direct rule with an established Northern Irish Assembly. Moreover, under
the presidency of Bill Clinton and the guidance of George Mitchell, the United States
government played a vital role as outside mediators operating from a neutral
position.
Contrarily, this level of outside involvement was not present within South
Africa. Although there was international pressure placed upon the apartheid
government to address the legalized systems of inequality and injustice, largely
through sanctions, when it came to the actual negotiations there was little outside
mediation. There was a level of advising given by NGOs and other countries in the
formation of certain policies that impacted the process of reconciliation as seen in
the drafting of the National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, but the peace
negotiations themselves took place directly between members of the South African
Government and the ANC. This differentiation leads us to the essential nature of
contact within the process of reconciliation.
In analyzing the peace processes of Northern Ireland and South Africa
alongside one another and through a lens of reconciliation, one of the starkest
differences that appears is the extent to which negotiations were characterized by
direct and positive contact. In South Africa many instances of direct and positive
contact occurred. This may have been due to the lack of outside mediation that was
directly involved in the process, but there were many more contributing factors.
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Contrary to this, Northern Ireland had very little instances of contact between the
framers of the agreement. The more removed groups were from the situations of
conflict, the more willing they were to have direct contact with the other parties. For
example, throughout the majority of the peace talks George Mitchell acted as the
primary mediator, spending time with all of the involved parties including Sinn Fein,
the UUP, the British Government, and the Irish Government. In spite of declaring
themselves neutral to the situation within Northern Ireland early on, both the
British and Irish governments were hesitant to be seen in direct communication
with those political parties that represented paramilitary organizations. In fact,
under Prime Minister Major, Britain refused to have direct contact with
paramilitaries. Even relations between the two countries themselves were not ideal
when the tentative talks began. Nonetheless, as the process continued especially
under Prime Minister Blair, both governments became much more willing to engage
directly with the various parties, including those representing paramilitaries. The
real issue of contact existed between the political parties of Northern Ireland, split
largely by the ideological lines of nationalism and unionism.
In a chapter on Northern Ireland and South Africa Professor of Peace and
Reconciliation at the University of Massachusetts, Padraig O’Malley, accentuates
how cultivating trust is fundamental to negotiations as well as achieving a peaceful
and lasting settlement.67 However, trust cannot be nurtured without positive and
continual experiences of contact with the other. It is in the act of positively
encountering the other that one comes face to face with their humanity and one’s
O’Malley, “Northern Ireland and South Africa: Hope and History at a Crossroads”,
284.
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own. Over time each person begins to understand the other more clearly as they
really are and not through the sole guise of stereotypes. It is in this sense of shared
understanding that little by little trust begins to form. This trust does not
necessarily predicate friendship because as Nelson Mandela said at the Arniston
conference, “You negotiate with your enemies, not with your friends”.68 Instead, this
kind of trust is best understood as believing in the integrity of the other, that they
too genuinely desire peace and are striving to overcome the present obstacles.69
When it came to the negotiations in Northern Ireland the indirect nature of
contact in which the conversations began by operating through intermediaries in
some ways continued throughout the entirety of the peace process. Delegates from
the main political parties who had refused to have contact with one another from
the beginning continued to refuse to talk with one another up through the signing of
the Good Friday Agreement. This left Senator George Mitchell the arduous job of
communicating between the different sides. In this way there was no opportunity
for members of the polarized groups to experience the humanity of the other. The
extent to which this stubborn refusal to interact with one another persisted was
illustrated by Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein and David Trimble of the UUP who did not
shake hands until after the signing of the Belfast Agreement, and this was merely a
formality for the public.70
Even with the overall lack of direct and positive interactions between the
Northern Irish political parties, there were a few instances of hope amidst the peace
ibid, 293.
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process. One of the most influential participants in helping to bring about a peace
settlement was Marjorie (Mo) Mowlam. Under the Labor Government in Britain, Mo
Mowlam served as the secretary of state of Northern Ireland from May 1997 to
October 1999 and made significant strides towards the validation and inclusion of
all within the multi-party negotiations. She was sharply criticized by David Trimble
who called for her removal multiple times because of a perceived nationalist bias.
Eventually, Trimble refused to interact with her stubbornly insisting upon dealing
with Blair directly. Whatever her alleged bias might have been Mowlam brought a
radically new approach to the negotiations. Unlike many of the other traditional
politicians participating in the multi-party talks, Mowlam recognized how
significant personal contact was to the success of an agreement. She illustrated this
most clearly in her decision to visit loyalist prisoners during January 1998 in the
Maze prison. Mowlam was convinced that the loyalist opinion within the jail
mattered and her actions demonstrated to loyalists that she took them seriously. By
initiating this contact she affirmed the value of their perspective and treated them
with dignity and equality by choosing to humanize rather than ostracize them. All of
these are key characteristics of reconciliation.
Beyond this, Marjorie Mowlam was strong willed and viewed by many as a
person of integrity. She was willing to listen as well as speak directly. These
characteristics coupled with her informal manner had a powerful effect in bridging
the gap between the political elites and grassroots communities. Her willingness to
risk her political position for the sake of peace through instances of direct contact
with the other, in many ways embody a lifestyle of reconciliation that helped move
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the peace process forward. Tragically, in 1997 it became public that she was
undergoing treatment for a brain tumor and while this did not diminish her
commitment to the peace process, in August of 2005 it took the life of the woman
who had given so much to peace in Northern Ireland.71
Another instance of hope within the Northern Ireland peace process that
illustrates the significance of positive situations of contact occurred in direct
relation to South Africa. As previously mentioned, in May of 1997 delegates from the
various factions in Northern Ireland traveled to South Africa where they met with
members of the government who had participated in their own peace settlement a
few years earlier. This was known as the Arniston Indaba or Conference. At this
conference the South Africans described their experiences and what they learned
about engaging in cross community negotiations in the hopes of aiding the
politicians of Northern Ireland in their own peace process. Two suggestions that
developed out of this were that “There should be transparency and openness in the
negotiating process” and “There must be no fudge factors”.72 In both cases the peace
process of Northern Ireland fell woefully short in these regards. On the one hand,
deep distrust existed between the nationalist and unionist parties, which their lack
of contact did not help. This distrust coupled with the many conversations that had
been conducted in secret earlier on in the peace process, gave the impression that
deals were being made behind closed doors. This proved to be an unhealthy
environment for negotiations, as it led to uncertainty and mistrust of the process. On
Cochrane, Northern Ireland: The Reluctant Peace, 176.
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the other hand, unlike the South African Constitution the Good Friday Agreement
was extremely ambiguous leaving its policies up to multiple interpretations.
Nevertheless, the South Africans also shared the importance that empathy
and positive personal contact have upon achieving a settlement and moving towards
genuine peace through reconciliation. First they mentioned that parties must learn
to put themselves in the shoes of the other.73 Through personal experiences with
another, one is able to become more empathetic. Empathy in turn helps one to
better understand the other and develop a respect for their position even if contrary
to one’s own. This openness to the process of humanization, understanding, and
respect developed through positive contact befits a lifestyle of reconciliation.
The politicians from South Africa explained that, “The level of trust that
develops among negotiators is a function of their ability to communicate outside the
formal settings of negotiating structures at crucial points”.74 Communicating outside
the systems of negotiation necessitates contact. In these informal interactions the
participants are removed from their formal personalities as negotiators and become
more difficult to dehumanize. George Mitchell understood the value of humanizing
the negotiation process because at one point during the late stages of negotiations,
the talks were held in the US ambassador’s residence in London where he insisted
all the participants eat meals together. Mitchell also asserted that there be no
discussion of issues at these meals and that the conversation be directed towards
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other subjects so that the participants could begin to see each other as human
beings rather than adversaries.75
Finally, in the experience of the South Africans, “Process is everything”.76 It is
the journey more than the destination that initiates real transformation, because
one cannot separate the goal from the process. Though contact is essential to
reconciliation it is not a panacea for conflict. It would be naive to assume that a
simple answer such as initiating positive interactions could solve situations of
inextricable complexity. Instead a more nuanced understanding is needed
recognizing reconciliation as a continual process that involves peaceful resolutions
of conflict but does not assume these as ends in themselves. Personal and positive
contact within reconciliation is therefore essential to continuing transformation of
both broken relationships and systems as people strive for justice, healing, and
peace.
O’Malley himself, who played a central role in establishing the Arniston
Conference, described eleven problems that he saw as obstacles threatening the
Northern Ireland peace process. The first two of these challenges that he
accentuated were, “The absence of continuing meaningful contact between the UUP
and Sinn Fein at the highest levels” and “The absence of contact between the IRA
and any party other than Sinn Fein”.77 Nevertheless, this conference can be seen as
an instance of hope because of some of the realizations that occurred from this
cross-country, cross-community engagement. In reference to the South African
Ibid, 297.
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political parties, chief negotiator for Sinn Fein, Martin McGuinness reflected,
“Obviously a number of years previously these people were bitter enemies, and here
they were sitting together. From watching their body language it was clear that
many of them actually liked each other, even loved each other. The message for me
was that if they can do that, we can do that also”.78 Additionally, Irish Taoiseach
Bertie Ahern stated that the conference in South Africa “Provided an invaluable
forum for face to face discussion between parties and people who found it extremely
difficult to meet on their home ground in Northern Ireland. In facilitating that
process of human interaction, the South African retreat could be described as a
precursor to the type of atmosphere which helped us achieve the breakthrough in
the Review”.79
Though there is much room for further study as to the impact that contact or
the lack thereof had on the actual peace processes in Northern Ireland, the essential
nature of positive contact in moving a country towards reconciliation can be seen in
a number of key instances throughout the narrative of South Africa as well. One
instance is the meetings of August 1987 in Dakar Senegal that took place between
members of the ANC in exile and progressive white South Africans setting a
precedent for the continuation of face to face communication.80 These three days of
interaction provided necessary instances of positive contact where each side came
to better understand the other and where both groups recognized their common
desire for peace. This laid the foundation for not only the necessary systemic
Ibid, 300.
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80 Thompson, A History of South Africa, 244.
78
79

48
changes that would have to take place within the nation in order to move towards
greater wholeness, but also the transformation of cross-party relationships.
Throughout the negotiations both the ANC and the NP recognized the value
of contact. Even when tensions were at their highest between June and September
of 1992 the parties ensured that a channel of communication remained intact
through their chief negotiators Cyril Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer. This illustrates
the recognition that interpersonal interaction is not the ultimate answer to
instances of conflict, because the situation could have become more polarized if de
Klerk and Mandela had continued to meet regardless of their growing frustration
with each other. Nevertheless, in the case of South Africa, contact was extremely
important in achieving a peace settlement and continuing to encourage a lifestyle of
reconciliation. This is exemplified in the forty-eight meetings that took place
between Cyril Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer. These personal meetings furthered the
efforts to bring about systemic change because they helped foster an incredible
amount of empathy between these two men and the difficulties, fears, and
hesitancies that each of their parties faced. This glimpse into the perspective of the
other, which was facilitated through contact, also allowed for great respect and
personal rapport to develop between them. Thus, the importance of these meetings
to the peace agreement cannot be overstated as the relationship that formed
between the chief negotiators made the way for the resumption of peace talks and
continued engagement in the process of reconciliation.
What the meetings between Cyril Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer did for their
personal relationship, the bosberaads of Decemeber 1992 and January 1993 did for
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the relationships of the ANC leadership and members of the South African
Government as a whole. These two meetings where the representatives lived
together, helped to confront false stereotypes, break down barriers, and bridge
existing divisions. Additionally, these meeting picked up where the meeting in
Senegal left off, nurturing greater understanding of the other through personal
experience and contact rather than preconceived prejudice. In this way, the positive
environment of interaction brought both sides in contact with the humanity of the
other where they experienced an aspect of Ubuntu. That “My humanity is
inextricably bound up in yours. We belong in a bundle of life”.81 Unlike what we see
in Northern Ireland, this humanization through positive contact allowed for a
greater sense of trust to pervade the peace negotiations and lead beyond mere
resolution towards a greater sense of wholeness in reconciliation.
In analyzing the structure of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the
intentionality devoted to the selection of commissioners further reflects the
importance of positive contact across divisions because of the way in which it
affirms diversity and unity. The seventeen commissioners were broadly
representative of South African society including women, men, black, white,
religious, irreligious, former supporters of apartheid, and resisters of apartheid.
This not only demonstrates the value of diversity, but also the inclusion of diversity
within the commission demonstrated for the first time that all members of the South
African society were equal. Moreover, the way in which the commissioners
interacted with each other over the course of the Commission discussing, debating,
Desmond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness, 1st Image Books ed. (New York,
N.Y.: Doubleday, 2000), 31.
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listening, deliberating, disagreeing, and cooperating embodied the reality that a
diverse group of people could work together towards unity.
Finally, there are countless examples of how public contact during the
hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission served to move some
individuals towards reconciliation through the humanization of the other. One of
these stories is that of Mrs. Ginn Fourie, a white woman, and Mr. Ggomfa, a black
man who had been part of the Azanian People’s Liberation Army. Mrs. Fourie’s
daughter was killed in what is known as the Heidelberg Tavern Massacre by Mr.
Ggomfa and two other accomplices. In an earlier criminal trial Mr. Ggomfa refused to
speak to Mrs. Fourie; however, three years later during the TRC amnesty trial he and
his accomplices apologized, addressed her with respect by calling her Mama, and
expressed genuine concern for her suffering.82 This transition not only exemplifies
the humanization that occurred between these two individuals but it also
represents the opening of interactions and dialogue between diverse groups of
people within the larger society.
Although there were many instances throughout the Commission of
experiences of repentance, forgiveness, and humanization like the story of Mrs.
Fourie and Mr. Ggomfa, it would be over idealistic not to recognize that there were
also many instances in which this did not occur despite contact within the TRC.
Reconciliation is not achieved at the point of forgiveness or repentance for it must
be continually lived into. These are important aspects of the reconciliation process
but nothing can erase the suffering and grief of past conflict. In this way
82
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reconciliation is not about getting back to where one was but continually being
transformed in relation to the past violations of human rights and striving to
transform the systems that perpetuate them. Therefore, contact is by no means a
panacea for instances of conflict but it is an essential aspect of the reconciliation
process, without which the best one can hope for is a peaceful resolution of conflict.

Conclusion

While the evidence from these two historical case studies supports the
position that positive contact is essential to the process of reconciliation, this is a
delicate matter that demands deep discernment before application to other
instances of conflict. In some cases the possibility of contact does not exist because
the depth of animosity is too great to foster any form of face to face interaction. At
the very least, this recognizes that engaging in the process of reconciliation through
contact takes time and is not easy, for harms have been done and that reality cannot
be excused. The seriousness and weight of this suggestion can be seen in the many
heartbreaking testimonies of South African and Northern Irish people who lost
loved ones in the cycles of violent conflict. As a result, it is no light matter suggesting
that people come face to face with the person who killed their sister, brother,
mother, father, child, or friend nor someone who violated one’s community.
Nonetheless, as the peace processes in both Northern Ireland and South Africa
suggest, if any form of lasting reconciliation is to begin developing, contact is
essential. The hope, healing, and peace of lasting reconciliation may never be fully
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realized on earth, but it is a lifestyle worth pursuing because it transforms broken
relationships and systems helping to embody the reality of future wholeness.
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Appendix
The Relationship Between Faith and Learning
One way that I view the relationship of faith and learning within this project
is in the understanding that, “The primary task of scholarship is to ‘pay attention’ to
the world”. This quotation is taken from the writings of Rhonda and Douglas
Jacobsen in their book, Scholarship and Christian Faith: Enlarging the Conversation. In
this work they describe from a Christian perspective the task of scholarship. My
project revolves around this perspective of paying attention to the world because it
focuses upon the past events within Northern Ireland and South Africa during the
1990s, which drastically impacted the lives of millions of people and continue to
influence our present world in unprecedented ways.
The historical nature of this project is significant because history engages
people in a type of cultural exchange that not only crosses boundaries of geography
but distances of time. In this way by approaching the historical past with humility
the historian learns greater empathy towards past cultures, in turn fostering greater
empathy in the present. The characteristic of empathy is essential to a lifestyle of
reconciliation because it allows for the humanization of the other, fosters a better
understanding of the other, and cultivates mutual respect. In the context of this
project the intersection of faith and learning is mainly manifest through this theme
of reconciliation.
The topic of reconciliation is complex and has deep roots within the Christian
faith. The story of Jacob and Esau’s reunion in Genesis 33 demonstrates this
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complexity. Though the brothers are reunited in an emotional encounter from
which forgiveness and repentance seem to emanate, the narrative ends with a
question. Does this story represent reconciliation? When the brothers part ways,
Jacob asserts that he will reunite with his brother in Seir (Gen. 33:14), yet instead he
goes to Succoth (Gen. 33:17). After this the text makes no mention of any interaction
between the brothers except at the death of their father Isaac in Genesis 35:29. Can
this really demonstrate reconciliation if reconciliation goes beyond one instance of
peacefully resolving conflict? Just as Genesis 33 begs this question the historical
narratives of conflict and peace in Northern Ireland and South Africa during the
1990s prompts this question too. As the South Africans elaborated upon in the Truth
and Reconciliation Report, reconciliation is not achieved at the point of forgiveness
or repentance for it is a lifestyle that is continually lived into. This lifestyle of
reconciliation is central to the gospel message, for as human beings we are called to
be reconciled with God and all creation. Therefore, within this project, the academic
study of these two historical accounts alongside one another and in light of
reconciliation, serves as the primary place of meeting between faith and learning.

